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ABSTRACT: The article explores the effect of the covid-19 epidemic on politics in Iran. It asks how people’s 
organisation and transformative experiences can counter forces and phenomena such as the current 
epidemic. The article reflects upon the extant and emergent potentialities of the current situation, imagining 
trajectories from the presence to the coming life in the post-epidemic future. The article is organised in the 
following sections: firstly, it provides an overview of the unfolding epidemic crisis in Iran to familiarise 
readers with the existing conditions and structures, including the effect of geopolitical constraints such as 
US-led sanctions and domestic models of crisis management. It then looks at how crises and health crises in 
particular destabilise the framework of interaction between power and people, and how this can be 
remodelled through the technologies of trust (such as vaccines and medical practice) that become essential 
to the continuation of political and social life. Within this frame, the article analyses how the epidemic 
produced and continues to shape forms of social organisation and cultural praxis, which originate from the 
mobilisation of solidarity and mutual help networks. These include an array of categories that have the 
potential to set the ground for a new sense of community amidst impeding crisis, counterpoising the high-
tech, authoritarian vision of grand solutions to the crisis with a low-tech mobilisation and human-centred 
vision. Finally, the objective is to inquire into the potentialities of a politics of solidarity and hope and its 
counter-values of demoralisation, fear and desperation. This is what the article elaborates as the ‘pedagogy 
of the virus’, a cognitive and practical journey resulting from the concurrence of crises in health/politics, 
whereby ordinary people learn to (re)enact organisation and community to change everyday life amidst 
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‘The struggle begins with men's recognition that they have been destroyed. Propaganda, management, 
manipulation – all arms of domination – cannot be the instruments of their rehumanisation. The only 
effective instrument is a humanising pedagogy…by which the teachers [ceases to] manipulate the students 
(in this instance, the oppressed), because it expresses the consciousness of the students themselves. 
Paulo Freire, The Pedagogy of the Oppressed: 42-3. 
 
‘The world of knowledge takes a crazy turn 
When teachers themselves are taught to learn’. 




1. Introduction: A pandemic in a village1 
 
At the end of March 2020, in a remote village in central Iran, a man in his seventies fell sick and, after a 
few days, died. A witty and well-known figure in the otherwise isolated plateau located around 80km south 
of Qom, he was a peasant and the owner of a mid-size sheep cattle and a keen trader in rural commodities; 
despite the outbreak of the news about the virus in mid-February of that year, the man used to travel in his 
Zamyad pickup car – the Iran-produced equivalent of the more expensive Nissan pickup – from town to 
town in furtherance of his businesses. He had ‘pre-existing cardiovascular problems and was overweight’, 
but people in the community whispered that ‘it was coronavirus [korona] that had taken away his life’.  
Fewer people than usual showed up at his funeral, which was held in the village where there is an adjacent 
cemetery on the slope overseeing the Haftad Qolleh valley. The entourage, including his closest kin, sat over 
3 metres or more apart from each other and wore masks and gloves ‘out of the fear that the virus had reached 
this forgotten land’. There was minimal physical interaction, few hugs and kisses and a certain concern over 
the wind blowing in the direction of participants further away. Some kept moving from place to place while 
awaiting the rituals of the burial, ‘because they feared that the wind could blow the virus towards them ’
bearing the virus from the dead to the alive. The dead man’s nephew recalled later: ‘I’ve never seen a funeral 
like this. It was so civilized, engar farhang budim, it seemed we were in the West’.2 It also seemed that the 
 
1 My gratitude goes to Professor Masoomeh Maarefvand from the University of Social Welfare and Rehabilitation Sciences, 
for her comments and discussion of this article, and to the ISASW for sharing their field experiences. The article uses 
‘epidemic’ rather than ‘pandemic’ as the former is the scientific definition whereas pandemic is the colloquial and media 
expression. All pandemics are also epidemics.  
2 Phone interviews with two members of the deceased man’s family, Markazi region, March 2020. The village is a field site 
where I have carried out research on Internet use in rural life since 2017. 
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ensemble of societal practices, communal judgements and the system of assigned values to events and 
occurrences – in other words, the moral grammar – had shifted with the looming epidemic. 
That event somehow sanctioned the coming of the covid-19 epidemic into the imaginative world of the 
village. The material presence of the virus, instead, never manifested itself in that context, at least not with 
full force as it had occurred in nearby cities, such as Qom and Arak; health workers had later confirmed that 
he had not been infected with covid-19 and that his death was caused by a heart attack due to an on-going 
hypertension disorder. By then, the actual diagnosis of the disease had little or no importance because 
villagers had organised themselves in such a way to ward off ‘the intrusion ’of the virus.  
By mid-April, they had created sui-generis check-points at the entrance of the village to monitor the 
movement of people, denying entry to all ‘those coming from the outside’. This move, which propped up in 
numerous villages across Iran, was organised ‘from below’, through kinship and grassroots community 
networks. However, it was later seconded and enfranchised by the Iranian government which gave Village 
Councils the right to manage the movement of people inside/outside their area of competence (Eghtesad 
Online, 2020). In June 2020, the government put an end to this ordinance, but wariness towards urban 
visitors remains alive and in force throughout that year, but especially during Iranian festivities such as 
Nowruz. 
This vignette on the life of a village in the times of the most severe epidemic in contemporary history is an 
unusual place where to start laying the ground for broader meditations on the transformation of social and 
political processes in Iran. But this micro-dimension has its own advantages: what we observe in a small 
village is testimony to the penetration of transnational forces – i.e. public perception of the pandemic, 
conflict and negotiations between local and national authorities, scientific advice and governmental decrees, 
local mobilisations informed and/or instigated by access to global information sources (e.g. social media, 
satellite TV, disinformation campaigns), and international sanction regimes – in an empirical setting that for 
structural and environmental reasons may well have stood isolated from them. The fact that these 
transnational forces reach far and deep in the public life of people living in the distant rural world shows how 
the village is a microcosm from where to start an analysis of health, life and politics amidst tectonic shifts 
generated by the covid-19 epidemic in the life of Iranians (and humans overall).  
To do so, the article explores the effect of the covid-19 epidemic on politics in Iran. It asks how people’s 
organisation and transformative experiences can counter forces and phenomena such as the current epidemic. 
The article reflects upon the extant and emergent potentialities of the current situation, depicting trajectories 
from the contemporary and the coming life in the post-epidemic future. Rather than reaching definitive 
conclusions on the question of solidarity in times of crisis, the article’s objective is to reflect upon the 
possibilities of studying such questions amidst transformative events such as the epidemic. 
The article is organised in the following sections: firstly, it provides an overview of the unfolding 
epidemic crisis in Iran to familiarise readers with the existing conditions and structures, including the effect 
of geopolitical constraints such as US-led sanctions and domestic models of crisis management. It then 
moves to look at how crises and health crises in particular destabilise the framework of interaction between 
power and people, and how this can be remodelled through the technologies of trust (such as vaccines and 
medical practice) that become essential to the continuation of political and social life. Within this frame, the 
article analyses how the epidemic has produced and continues to transform forms of social organisation and 
cultural praxis, which occur through the mobilisation of solidarity and mutual help networks. These include 
an array of categories that have the potential to set the ground for a new sense of community amidst 
impeding crisis, counterpoising the high-tech, authoritarian vision of grand solutions to the crisis with a low-
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politics of solidarity and hope, and its counter-values of demoralisation, fear and desperation. This is what 
the article elaborates as the pedagogy of the virus, a cognitive and practical journey which is produced by the 
concurrence of crises in health/politics, whereby ordinary people learn to (re)enact organisation and 
community to change everyday life amidst societal and political disruption. The pedagogy of the virus is a 
matter-of-experience rather than theory, it is cumulative rather than impatient and instantaneous; it is a 
school where people exercising their agency work and learn together to overcome a crisis, rather than 
following pre-set models of engagement. The article meditates upon the pedagogy of the virus, its 
potentialities and its pitfalls, and its future in the aftermath of the epidemic. 
 
1.1 Biological versus social times of the pandemic 
 
Epidemics suspend the flow of ordinary life. Daily occurrences and rituals change in such a dramatic way 
that life itself appears under a different light, even when – from negligence or necessity – the acts of the 
everyday carry on as usual. As events with a broad lifeworld, epidemics have a health and a social life. The 
historian of science and medicine Charles Rosenberg hints at this double nature when he writes that, ‘as a 
social phenomenon an epidemic has a dramaturgic form. Epidemics start at a moment in time, proceed on a 
stage limited in space and duration, following a plot line of increasing and revelatory tension, move to a 
crisis of individual and collective character, then drift towards closure ’(Rosenberg 1989: p. 2). The timing 
of these stages is unpredictable and not always unidirectional. The social ending of an epidemic may not 
coincide with its biological closure, but rather with the conclusion of it being a public concern, even a media 
crisis. This is the case for previous epidemics, such as polio, and for current ones, such as HIV/AIDS. The 
height of concern for them were respectively the 1960s and 1980s-1990s, when the public and the 
governments considered these diseases a threat to the social, economic and political order. Neither polio nor 
HIV/AIDS have been eradicated in the contemporary world. Polio is endemic in part of South Asia and sub-
Saharan Africa, whereas HIV/AIDS exists across the world from South America, to Southern Africa, Russia 
and South East Asia. However, the social choreography that these epidemics generated in the past is no 
longer recognizable in the public eye today, because media and governmental focus have shifted to other 
matters of concern (Greene and Vargha 2020).  
So, epidemics exist as biological as much as social phenomena and, because of their nature, they perform 
as part of a web of actions towards and response to them. They have a biological rhythm and a social rhythm, 
which rarely overlap. Fear governs the social time of the epidemic. It reveals what we previously ignored, a 
hidden enemy, and it triggers a war with an invisible force that may hide in every other human. Within the 
logic of fear, biological life (zöe) trumps civic and political life (bios), dislodging those rituals of support – 
such as in a community’s practices of mourning – and the vicinity to fellow others in times of hardship – as 
it occurs in conflict and war. If in a crisis the logic of fear prevails over all other instincts and rationalities, 
the very substrate of society defaults, reducing politics and community to the impulse of individual survival 
(against the virus or, for that matter, any other enemy: the Muslim, the migrant, the communist, the 
foreigner). Yet, it is under those conditions of disruption that human society expresses vital forces such as 
solidarity, the expression and practice of altruistic support aimed not solely at others as humans, but aimed at 
them as part of a union of you-and-me, of us-and-you, in a shared fluid vitality. The logic of solidarity is 
what enables ‘individuals who were submerged in reality, merely feeling their needs, to emerge from reality 
and perceive the causes of their needs’ (Freire 2018: p. 90), where they can find a sense of totality. That is 
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perhaps where the word solidarity holds its Latin original meaning, ‘the act of becoming solid, full, 
complete’. 
Seen through the prism of tensions between biological life and political and social life, the current 
epidemic is a historical moment to reclaim the power of humanity and of humanization. This is where the 
pedagogy of the virus should manifest itself: this can occur, in line with the argument put forward by Paulo 
Freire in Pedagogy of the Oppressed, that there cannot be a revolutionary process  (understood as a 
fundamental change in the organisation of life and politics) without a critical awareness of people’s role ‘as 
Subjects of the transformation’, rather than as mere objects in the plans of revolutionaries (Freire 2018: p. 
100). Without this dialogical relation, any process of transformation subsequent to a crisis will trigger the 
logics of fear and myth-making (e.g. conspiracies about the virus, those bringing it), which are the driving 
force of reactionary politics (Brownlee and Ghiabi 2021).3 
Before discussing the emerging practice of solidarity that have appeared in Iran, let us take a look at the 
biological, social, and political times of the epidemic and how these have shaped people’s experience of the 
crisis. 
 
The biological time of the epidemic  
 
On February 19, 2020 the Iranian Ministry of Health informed the public that two individuals had tested 
positive for covid-19 in Qom. It remained unclear how the virus had reached the holy city. Several sources 
referred to Chinese Muslim scholars returning from Wuhan or Chinese labourers on infrastructure projects; 
others identified Iranian merchants trading with China. By the end of February, Iran’s deputy health minister 
and several high-profile political figures, including several members of parliament who had won seats in the 
February 21, 2020 parliamentary elections tested positive for the virus (Abedini and Razieh 2020). It 
appeared that the government had been caught utterly unprepared. 
By December 2020, Iran was going through its third wave of infection. The capital Tehran was put on full 
lockdown to avoid the overwhelming of the medical facilities, which were running at full capacity. The 
government declared that 95% of the country was in an alarming state (4 out 5 in the degree of severity).4 
Iran’s Ministry of Health, grappling with the fluid biological nature of the virus, used an eloquent metaphor 
to describe it. It said that covid-19 was a shotor-e gav palang, which is an obsolete Persian expression to 
define ‘giraffe’. Literally shotor-e gav palang means ‘a camel-bull-leopard’ (like a giraffe which has a 
camel’s hump, a bull’s snout, and a leopard’s coat). An ambiguous biological being, which is hard to know 
how it affects people’s lives, the virus could bite (like a leopard); it could kick (like a camel); and it could 
gore with its horns (like a bull). This fluid existence of the virus is determined by the biological time of the 
epidemic, which by April 2021 was in its fourth – post-Nowruz – wave in Iran. While the virus underwent 
biological changes, becoming either more contagious, less aggressive, or changing in symptomatology, the 
 
3 For a discussion of myths and politics, see Jesi (1979, 1989). 
4 By mid-October, Iran had ca. 30,000 deaths and almost half a million cases, of which ca. 400,000 had recovered. However, 
the government itself and public health officials within the country have more or less openly acknowledged that the numbers 
were lower than the real scope of the epidemic. In a report published by the Parliament’s Research Center (markaz-e 
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epidemic transformed the social organisation, cultural praxis and people’s ideas of politics in a cumulative 
way, a process that is determined by the social time of the epidemic. 
 
The social time of the epidemic  
 
On March 16, 2020 angry crowds defied the government’s closure of the shrines of Fatemeh Masumeh in 
Qom and Imam Reza in Mashhad, the two holiest sites in Iran. The Qom crowd, led by a cleric, shouted that 
‘Tehran did a damned thing [ghalat karde]; the Minister of Health did a damned thing, the President did a 
damned thing [to close the shrine],’ for shrines are places of intercession and healing (VOA News 2020). 
Little mattered that Ayatollah Alam-ol-Hoda, the Supreme Leader’s representative in Khorasan-e Rajavi, had 
spelled out that ‘Imam Reza is not in his tomb, neither he is in the golden shrine… Imam Reza heals, gold 
and silver don’t heal!’. 
The social time of the epidemic, much like its biological time, is disputed and nebulous, in its outset as 
much as in the prospect of its closure. Measures of containment are the public signs measuring the social 
time; shifts in contagion rate and viral spread are markers of the biological time. For both, there are 
competing starts and possible ends; but it is the most contentious manifestations that mark the historical 
record, concomitant and connected to other events, in this case the series of public scandals and tragedies in 
2019-2020 (i.e. clampdown on December 2019 protests, assassination of General Qasem Soleimani, 
downing of the P752 passenger flight). 
Disruptive events such as epidemics rearrange culture and ethics – and the understanding of larger 
historical time. Restrictions on social gatherings and public life unsettle the rituals of mourning, malady, 
pilgrimage and celebration, but not without causing opposition and resentment. All over the world, a tension 
has arisen between those demanding a pause of social rituals to ensure the preservation of life and those 
deeming such rituals essential to life itself. Angry protesters seeking emotional comfort in the sacred spaces 
of Qom’s Fatemeh Ma‘sumeh shrine, like Orthodox Jews in Jerusalem or in New York and Christians in 
Orthodox churches in Greece, clashed with the rationale of prevention measures such as lockdowns (Al-
Monitor 2020). In Italy far-right politicians such as Matteo Salvini ‘begged’ the government to allow Easter 
religious celebrations to go ahead, affirming that ‘science is not enough’ (Zapperi 2020). In Spring 2021, in 
spite of now clear evidence of high infection rate, he reiterated his stance against lockdowns. These 
examples could be interpreted as the embodiment of a clash of irrationality versus rationality, religion versus 
secular science, or of political cynicism in electoral calculi. Yet, people attending non-religious rituals, such 
as football matches, new year celebrations, rave parties or, for that matter, US White House fundraising 
events, have equally opposed the bans and restrictions instructed by public health experts. In Iran, for 
instance, large crowds gathered in the parks of Tehran’s Ekbatan neighbourhood during the Nowruz festival 
of chaharshanbeh suri – a secularised folk event – or decided to depart for long-distance travels during the 
new year’s holidays of 2020 and 2021, in spite of the Ministry of Health’s advice to stay at home. On 
October 8, 2020, the death of Mohammad Reza Shajarian, Iran’s foremost classical singer, brought 
thousands of people in the street chanting in front of the Qods Hospital where he passed away. The totality of 
those attending wore masks; but they sang loudly – therefore increasing the chances of transmission, and 
maintained no physical distance (Iran Panorama 2020). However, there was no public outcry against those 
mourning Shajarian, whereas there was much public opposition for (more or less religious) mourners during 
Muharram, which contributed to the Manichean portrayal of superstition versus science, religious zeal 
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against secular rationality. In reality, both events re-presented moments of religious, emotional expressions 
amidst the widespread disruption caused by the virus. In oxymoronic ways, it is rational to find comfort 
beyond reason. 
Religious rituals characterising the flow of everyday life faced a major transformation. In Catholic 
countries, the clergy gave up its historical and liturgical duty of providing the sacraments to dying people 
and to give comfort to the sick. Science in the form of medicine trumped the secular role of religion and 
those practicing its liturgies, the priests. This is perhaps the most important eclipse of the role of religion in 
our societies as an organised cultural practice (Agamben 2020), but not as an emotional desire. In Iran, this 
event was mitigated, not so much by the prompting of the higher echelon of the Islamic Republic – who 
similar to their Catholic counterparts upheld the exigency of public health isolation – but rather by the 
grassroots organisations of clerics and volunteers. Low-level clerical cadres mobilised to guarantee the 
performing of the rituals of dying and burial, while the highest cadres of the clergy agreed to limiting the 
public role of religious events to prevent the spread of the virus. A tension arises between cultural practice 
such as the rituals of everyday life that give meaning to the existence of people, in their spiritual and 
collective form, and the imperatives of public health as informed by scientific assessment. And as burials and 
mourning are governing principles in the social life of humans, the attending of these events shaped the 
social time of the epidemic which would have otherwise disrupted it by imposing a biological rhythm onto it. 
Hence, the significance of shrines in punctuating the social rhythm of the epidemic. 
 
The politico-economic time of the epidemic  
 
Caught between domestic pressure to intervene and the external challenges of geopolitical and economic 
isolation and US sanctions, the Rouhani government initially adopted a policy of wait and see. 
Commentators have pointed out that the economic cost of an interventionist approach involving a large-scale 
lockdown and public assistance to the unemployed would fall beyond the government’s financial capabilities 
(Salehi-Isfahani 2020). State-led strong interventions were at odds with the government’s political 
persuasion: Rouhani had been elected on a platform promising a retraction of the state from the economy, 
something that would be impractical under a lockdown where state presence is vital to avoid large-scale 
disruption and disorder. A draconian lockdown risked to uproot the livelihoods of the working class and 
large numbers of the self-employed in the informal sector, a scenario that could be conducive to bread riots 
and mass discontent on an even larger scale than the 2019 protests (Ghiabi 2020a). 
The US-imposed sanction regime has had a profound effect on the political management of the epidemic. 
The domestic pharmaceutical industry, which produces more than 90% of all drugs inside Iran, has been 
under heavy pressure, with medicine shortages affecting people’s general health. In turn this has a profound 
impact on the biological capacity to respond with a strong immune system to the virus (Ameli 2020). Thus, 
Iran is faced with a crisis that, in many ways, is larger than that faced by most other states, because it faces a 
geopolitical crisis coupled with an economic sanction regime amongst the harshest in history. Faced with 
these crises, the country lacked the means adopted by countries in the Global North, which have introduced 
fiscal measures, long-term lockdowns, and other protective welfare measures. Iran’s Ministry of Health 
declared that the medical sector should take into account the economic and regional as well as cultural 
conditions and produce a protocol that can correspond to these necessities: ‘We are searching for an 
indigenous model [model-e bumi’] (Behdasht 2020), an idea reiterated by the Head of the National Security 
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governments across much of the world – is a context-specific model, which follows the political times of the 
epidemic in space, i.e. Iran’s geopolitical and security place in the world.5  
Rouhani's government found the inspiration for this localised model in what has become the paradigm of 
crisis intervention in the post-revolutionary era: the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) (Ghiabi 2019). In this way, the 
political time of the epidemic overlapped with the timing of the war, which in 2020 had its fortieth 
anniversary. What seemed a haphazard initial response and a reluctant strategy turned into a mass 
mobilisation across the state apparatus. From a rhetorical standpoint, the Iranian state has mobilised its art 
and visual culture machinery to make sure those fighting on the frontlines against the epidemic – the health 
workers – were given the due prominence and were acknowledged as heroes of the contemporary nation. 
The decision to label health workers as martyrs on the line of duty – shahid khedmat – enables the state 
rhetoric to temper the hardships – mental and physical – these categories are going through, equating them 
those heroes who suffered through the war (Schwartz and Gölz 2020). The use of the term modāfeān -e 
Salāmat (‘defenders of health’) is similar to the modāfeān-e haram (‘defenders of the sacred shrine’, i.e. the 
Shi’a shrines in Syria and Iraq) or to modāfeān-e vatan (‘the country’s defenders’). Tragedy is part of this 
choreography, which is one aspect of the epidemic’s social and political time/life – one that had its proper 
dimension in Iran’s history of public mobilisation through sacrifice, especially in the post-revolutionary 
period. 
But the political time of the epidemic lacked the authoritarian, top-down impetus that distinguished the 
response of other countries, where the state is strong and highly centralised. Countries such as China, 
Vietnam, South Korea and Italy, put in place a powerful response with strict measures and mechanisms of 
control of the epidemic introducing far-reaching limits to civic liberties and the deployment of police and 
military forces to enforce a control regime. Iran did not fall under this category even though the Iranian state, 
by all definitions, is a powerful machine in economic, enforcement and sociological terms; and limiting civic 
liberties would have posed, in principle, a less problematic step than in more democratic countries. Instead, 
the epidemic did not halt the parliamentary process – including the elections – and a lively and 
confrontational political debate carried on amidst the emergency, undermining in several instances the 
governmental plan of intervention. Criticism against the government, the ministries, law enforcement and 
other state apparatuses remained vibrant. Rather than a democratic impulse, however, this sporadic and 
reluctant governance was itself a product of the infra-elite tensions and negotiations that had been at the core 
of Iran’s state management and crisis response. Reluctant governance may have avoided hyper-policing, but 
it had also given priority to state prerogatives such as smooth electoral process (which otherwise would have 
exposed the political order to accusation of dictatorial behaviour). All of this had put the health sector under 







5 As in the case of Sweden, where the chief epidemiologist envisioned a policy rooted in the socio-economic and cultural 
fabric of the country. That, nonetheless, has come at a high price compared to neighbouring Nordic countries. 
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2. Technologies of Trust in Health and Politics  
 
The logic of fear prospers upon a crisis in knowledge production. Likewise, the epidemic exists as an 
epidemiological crisis but also as an epistemological crisis, a crisis in the way people know and understand 
the world. Doubts about the origins of the virus and the politics behind it have been a powerful means which 
can shape people’s minds about the epidemic and national and global politics. Different sources of authority 
both in the scientific world and in policymaking have expressed doubts about the viral origin of the 
epidemic, undermining the efforts to contain the virus through physical distancing measures and lockdowns. 
Even prominent global scientists and thinkers such as Giorgio Agamben strongly criticised the way 
governments around the world created a state of emergency built upon panic and fear (Agamben 2020).6 This 
is not unlike what happened, again, with HIV in South Africa, where heads of states at different turns and 
prominent intellectuals embraced conspiracies about the HIV/AIDS health treatment and prevention 
measures, for instance on the value of anti-retroviral drugs. In the Iranian case, the authorities have 
maintained a relative clarity on the seriousness of the epidemic and its risks, even though there were attempts 
at covering it up in the initial weeks of the outbreak. After faltering in the first weeks of the epidemic when 
he conceded to conspiracy theories about the origin of the virus, the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has 
been straightforward in his compliance with the social distancing measures even during the religious 
ceremonies of Moharram where he attended a recital session on his own and maintained a safe distance from 
the pulpit of the maddah, the eulogist singing the tragedy of Imam Hussein and his companions in Karbala. 
But trust in public institutions is a key element in epidemic solutions. In Iran, the lack of trust in official 
discourses is endemic and caused by a historical experience of plots and conspiracies that effectively took 
place and were covered by the narratives of those in charge or foreign powers (Alimardani and Elswah 2020; 
Mohammadi et al. 2020). It follows that the epidemic occurred in a setting whence people and governments 
lived in a state of suspicion and mistrust towards ‘news’ and ‘events’. 
Moreover, the relentless disinformation campaigns that have targeted knowledge production and 
information-making in Iran exacerbated the game of perception of the epidemic. Trust in public institutions 
and in the state-owned media reached its nadir after the tragic event of the Ukrainian airplane accident in 
early January. Without an effective public information machine, conflicting instructions circulated on 
Iranians’ social media, involving conspiracy theories from East and West (e.g. it’s the work of the Chinese; 
it’s an American plot; it’s a Russian weapon…), the number of deaths, the access to vaccines to the political 
elite, the experimental trial of domestic vaccines on vulnerable and marginal social groups. The spread of 
fake news is not peculiar to Iran; but its reach and potency there, is on a different scale because of the enmity 
of the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia which have mobilised large sums to wage a propaganda war 
(Mortazavi and Hussein 2020).  
A paradigmatic case occurred when, at the end of February, large numbers of people – including 
numerous contacts in the author’s Telegram and WhatsApp contact lists – started to share videos that hinted 
at a coming apocalypse. The video showed raining eggplants [sic!] in different parts of Tehran, with those 
 
6 Agamben’s critique of the political response to the pandemic generated a great deal of anger among in Italian and foreign 
newspapers, where he was accused of being a ‘negazionista’, a term generally used for those denying the Shoah. Regardless 
of his opposition to social distancing measures, Agamben’s analysis of the way the epidemic is transforming our world remain 
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portrayed in the video shocked by the event. The event was reported in different settings of the capital, 
involving different people, who were all taken by utter surprise while posing for a picture or talking on a 
video call. A few days following the event, Iran’s Fatah Policy for Cyber Crime declared that it had scaled 
up its monitoring programme of fake news on covid-19, arresting two dozen people involved in the prank. 
But in a condition of heightened domestic and geopolitical security, extraordinary signs have the potency to 
unsettle an already crumbling public trust and morale, unveiling the fragility of Iran’s public institutions and 
their shrinking capacity to project trust to the people; as well as engendering fear in people.7 As epidemics 
reconfigure public life, the need of mitigating the fear of epoch-making events compels people to cope 
through their own repertoire of cultural practices with supernatural forces such as the virus.  
In the context of the village described in the first part of the article, local workers praised the curative 
power of a pill which a wealthy landlord had brought back from a trip to China. When one of his workers 
had caught the virus, the landlord asked him to quarantine in a room before giving him the pill. Locals swore 
that within two days the middle-aged man was back in full force. Fantasies about modern science (often 
coming from advanced capitalist unknowns, such as China and Israel) parallel the superstitious claims of 
traditional healers. Establishing public trust is not a minor and temporary issue. It will influence the forms 
and capacity of Iranian society as the epidemic will move to a new stage, with the creation of a vaccine or 
other forms of treatment or governmental interventions. As technologies of trust, vaccines and other forms of 
epidemic management require high levels of public trust, lest they be undermined in the objective to 
eradicate contagious spread (Vargha 2018). The process of reclaiming public trust in Iran is now outside the 
realm of the state. Instead, public trust – a key technology of government crisis – is remerging as part of the 
integration of biomedical approaches foregrounded by the biomedical workers, grassroots organisations 
active in social and socialised medicine and in the infrastructure of support and intervention of solidarity and 
mutual help among ordinary people. This triggers an imperfect balance between vertical technocratic 
interventions – leading to biomedical responses, e.g. pharmaceuticals and vaccines – together with horizontal 
infrastructures of mutual care and health provision (Greene and Vargha 2020). It is an essential part of the 
pedagogy of the virus, of learning from the epidemic.  
Although, the development of an effective vaccine gives rise to optimism across the world (but especially 
in the Global North), Iranians face hurdles in accessing significant doses of it due to the economic effects 
and the shortage of foreign currency caused by the US sanction regime. Ali Khamenei’s veto on US and UK 
vaccines – but his tacit acceptance of UK vaccines produced in India – have cast doubts on the readiness of 
the state to priorities public health over geopolitical calculi and public relations. By April 2021, Iran had 
received ca. 700,000 doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine through COVAX, the international initiative to 
promote equitable distribution of the vaccine. But doubts on the AZ efficacy and its side-effects have 
hitherto coupled with a slowing down in COVAX distribution plans. So, Iran has relied on its geopolitical 
 
7 In the United States, the QAnon conspiracy believes that lockdowns are used as a measure to cover up the arrest of an 
international cabal of paedophiles who are fighting against US President Donald J. Trump. According to this group, Trump is 
leading a behind-the-scene operation against this cabal which involves thousands of very high-profile figures in American 
society and economy, some holding that they worship Satan. The ‘ideas’ of QAnon have now spread in the UK under the 
group Save Our Children (SAC). They equally oppose epidemic prevention measures and mask wearing. 
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ally, the Russian Federation, to provide 60 million doses of Sputnik V while it works towards the completion 
of a domestic vaccine. Again, geopolitics matters in health security. 
While Iranian scientists have successfully completed the first and second stages of an indigenous vaccine, 
full scale trials will delay its potential distribution at least to the latter part of 2021, all things going well 
(Mehr News Agency 2020). Even then, a vaccination programme on a country-wide scale puts Iran at a 
crossroads. On the one hand, people lack trust in official narratives and, consequently, are reluctant to follow 
impromptu guidance from the state; on the other, observation of recent historical processes show that 
Iranians have expressed a high level of confidence in scientific and, especially, medical guidance and 
protocols and have supported the directives emanating from the Ministry of Health. Policies on polio 
vaccination, treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS, treatment and maintenance programme for ‘addiction’ 
to opiates and more recently social distancing measures, are all good examples of how trust and cooperation 
have worked in building and promoting health-oriented policies (Moussavi et al. 2012; Behrouzan 2016; 
Ghiabi 2019). In particular, people are responding to the rapid changes in public life with new forms of 
social organisation and grassroots mutual aid. The multiple crises – in public health, employment, 
governance and the economy – brought about by the pandemic, and the resulting practices of solidarity, are 
the workshop where Iran’s post-epidemic futures will take shape. 
 
3. A new sense of community  
 
The way social forces and ordinary people have acted upon their plight is a sign of what is there to remain 
as the crisis intensifies and moves to break down the world as we know it. Within the struggles of today 
around access to health, prevention of infection, support for livelihoods and the maintenance of education 
and the creation of economic opportunities and social dignity, lies the future of politics and the politics of 
life (Fassin 2018). This struggle is a walk on a very thin, sharp and long edge along which the risks of failure 
could lead to fanaticism and reactionary politics, to the reification of a cultural-and-political 
counterrevolution, which is part of a longer trend predating the epidemic (e.g. Brexit, Trump, Bolsonaro, 
Modi). To gauge the spirit of the post-epidemic futures, I suggest taking a look at the experience of solidarity 
and mutual aid, which have emerged in Iran over the last 18 months. On the one hand, the experiences 
reported below take form in an exceptional time – as discussed earlier, i.e. the times of the epidemic. On the 
other, these experiences of solidarity and social activism are not disjointed from the context of people’s 
mobilisation in the post-1979. The difference is in that the epidemic is not a political event stricto sensu, 
whereas the acts of participation and solidarity amidst the revolution where all political in nuce. Yet, forms 
of solidarity in contemporary epidemic times revitalise latent forms of solidarity, which in times of 
disruption (war, protest, revolution, disaster) have manifested themselves overtly. 
 
3.1 Health care and Social Workers 
 
On the frontlines, health care workers – surgeons, anaesthesiologists, nurses – have volunteered to work 
around the clock to compensate the many shortcoming of the health system in Iran – which finds itself in the 
crossfire of US sanctions, domestic economic crisis, and the limits of slow government response. This is not 
simply another case of doctors and nurses being on the frontlines and being called ‘heroes ’or ‘martyrs’. 
What occurred in Iran is on a broader scale and it involves specialists in different health sectors who, during 
lockdown and amidst the crisis, volunteered to carry out research and consultation with all those in need, free 
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and the provision of basic health responses in addition to covid-19. Physicians and specialist consultants 
created WhatsApp and Telegram groups where they could be contacted for consultation in case people in 
need of medical referral could not attend hospitals or were in urgent need, or simply needed reassurance on 
their status and/or treatment. The Iranian Scientific Association of Social Workers (ISASW) activated a 
hotline and a website to reach out to those seeking support amidst the crisis. The hotline redirects the calls to 
specific task forces staffed by one of three professionals: a social worker, a psychologist or a psychiatrist. 
Based on a first assessment, those who call in are forwarded to specialists who provide both individual and 
group therapy (ISASW 2020a). The medical cadre involved in the programme do so on a pro bono basis, 
dispelling the negative aura surrounding the private medical profession over the last decade.  
The ISASW mobilisation targets specifically groups at the margins of epidemic governance, such as 
children and the homeless. As across the globe, children must adjust to new life conditions under lockdown. 
For many working-class families, school closures and the lack of physical space and the mounting emotional 
and economic pressure turns the household environment into a disturbing space for children’s daily life and 
their psychophysical development. Iran’s director for social harms at the Welfare Organisation declared that 
‘although there are no precise statistics… calls to the social emergency number on the 123 line have gone up, 
which means there is an increase in child abuse and spousal abuse’ (Shahrvand Online 2020). To facilitate a 
safe environment at home, the ISASW created a number of free booklets with games and activities for 
children of different age groups, with the objective of decreasing pressure on families (ISASW 2020b). 
Public officials made clear that welfare provision and healthcare is free of charge and also available to 
peddlers, refugees and those working in the informal economy (UNHCR 2020). In this setting, the use of 
digital infrastructures to reach otherwise marginalised populations makes interventions faster and more 
flexible, limiting the risks of viral infection amidst rising cases related to covid-19. Where direct action is 
necessary, outreach social workers have intervened in impoverished neighbourhoods. Large numbers of 
homeless people and child workers gather in the streets and alleys or under the highway bridges, heightening 
the risk of mass contagion (Ghiabi 2020). 
The highly mobile urban population of homeless people is doubly at risk from the covid-19 pandemic. 
Many of them do not have proper identification cards and risk being left out of the public health system. 
Exposed and hustling to earn money, many also have comorbidities and weakened immune systems, which 
means that they suffer from other health conditions such as tuberculosis or HIV/AIDS that increase their risk 
of serious illness from covid-19. They often do not have access to the Internet so they lack basic information 
regarding the virus and proper preventive measures – or changing policy interventions, for that matter. 
Charities and local associations – based in mosques, congregation centres and in neighbourhoods – are 
coordinating with social workers to provide hand sanitisers, masks and gloves. They are also working to 
disseminate information on preventative practices, either by passing out brochures or by reading the 
brochure’s text aloud in squares and public parks. These associations maintain regular contact with local 
personalities to guarantee swift intervention and referral to hospitals in case vulnerable people manifest 
covid-19 symptoms. Therapeutic communities and rehabilitation centres – also known as ‘camps’ (kamp) in 
Iran – have taken up the duty of quarantining homeless or ‘risky’ drug users, hence acting as a non-state 
mechanism to manage the pandemic (Ghiabi, 2019; Majles Showra-ye Eslami-ye Iran 2020).  
Another case is represented by Afghan Iranians who have resided in the country for decades, but that in a 
majority of cases hold only temporary documents or no documents at all (Salmani et al. 2020). At the 
margins of public health interventions, Afghan Iranians were guaranteed access to health through both 
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governmental and localised interventions (Dehqan and Vanaki 2020), the latter including the mobilisation of 
Afghan doctors residing in Iran. For instance, a 38-year old Afghan refugee became the head of the covid-19 
public outreach programme in the Isfahan province. She carried out remote and in-patient consultations with 
Afghan families infected by the virus or who feared being infected. With more than 100,000 Afghan 
refugees in the Isfahan province alone, the doctor had a team of five medical personnel which carried out 
over 200 referrals every evening, free of charge (Bhoyroo 2020). Solidarity towards Afghan Iranians is 
justified also in public health terms as it guarantees screening coverage and the monitoring of potential 
pockets of infection among a population that has been neglected by public institutions. That said, the 
question remains that far more Afghan Iranians should access the medical profession. 
The epidemic affects life also through the fear that it engenders and through the organisational effects on 
people’s lives, with very high levels of anxiety, manifesting panic attacks, stress, and suicidal reactions. In 
response to this, the ISASW has mobilised its network of support to guarantee care for all those facing the 
challenge of living in a state of epidemic, a condition of unsettledness and heightened psychological pressure 
to which many – especially among the younger generations – had not been exposed before. The mobilisation 
of volunteer groups, such as professional associations and grassroots charities, occurred autonomously from 
state-led initiative and through mutual help groups.8  
 
3.2 Clerics and Mosques 
 
Even the clergy mobilised through mutual aid groups to fulfil the duty of rituals and liturgies that have 
been disrupted by the epidemic. Receiving support from religious foundations, armed with personal 
protective equipment (PPE), clerics guaranteed that the dead could be cleansed before burial according to the 
Islamic rituals. In this way, the clerics could perform ghosl (ritual purification) for the dead, reclaiming their 
role as those who oversee the rituals, which define key moments in people’s lives, rather than as the ruling 
class. This is no minor service for all those families for whom the dead must bid farewell to the world 
according to conventions and traditions and who could not do so given the health crisis disrupting them.  
Likewise, mosques mobilised to collect food and basic goods to redistribute them to the many families 
that found themselves in dire need amidst the lockdown and the economic crisis heightened by the epidemic. 
In some instances, mosques were transformed into production factories for PPEs as well as for the relocation 
of key equipment. An effective network of centres throughout the country, the mosques reclaimed a public 
space that they had lost since the 1980s, during the Iran-Iraq War, when they operated as recruitment centres 
for the front and redistribution agencies for the local communities. So, in the times of the epidemic, the 
mosques were reclaimed as centres of mutuality and solidarity support rather than as centres for ideological 
propaganda and bastion of clerical power. At the same time, mosques did not turn into a bastion of 
opposition to the scientific advice on social distancing and prevention measures, as it had occurred in the 
cholera epidemics of the 19th century (Afkhami 2019). Even though there were instances of opposition to 
 
8 On March 3, 2021, a court ordered the dissolution of the Imam Ali Popular Student Relief Society (IAPSRS) following the 
Ministry of Interior’s accusation that IAPSRS had gone beyond its charitable objectives and have breached the regulations for 
NGOs. The case, which featured prominently within and without Iran, marks a telling example of the fluid redlines of formal 
civil society activism, especially in times of disruption. It also highlights how solidarity is a contested ground with divergent 
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epidemic prevention measures, religious representatives embraced the guidelines sponsored by the 
governmental disposition, even when it came at the cost of limiting or cancelling ritual events with large 
followings. 
There are also multifarious instances of local organisation of solidarity. Independent women’s associations 
in working-class neighbourhoods have set up local factories to produce masks after receiving training 
through the mediation of NGOs (Irna 2020). In the town of Divandarreh, in Iranian Kurdistan, local families 
raised more than $23,000 (a very large sum for such a small town, especially considering the devaluation of 
the Iranian rial) to purchase intensive care unit equipment when the hospital lacked the means to treat one of 
their fellow citizens who had fallen ill with covid-19 (Irna 2020). In the city of Bushehr, university students 
set up workshops to produce disinfectant liquid and distribute it to the community, while community 
organisations set up small factories to produce masks and other PPEs (Irib News 2020). Examples like this 
are innumerable and span between the work of philanthropy, altruistic gest, to organised efforts to minimise 
– or at least manage – the epidemic and its effect on livelihoods (Soureh 2020; Batmanghelidj 2020). 
These practices of solidarity are not simply cases of volunteering, self-help or civil society activism and 
are not merely compensating for gaps in the state's response. They are a pedagogy of struggle amidst 
disruption and of community organising primarily within the popular classes. Educators, social workers and 
professionals are displaying mutual aid and solidarity with the popular classes, not on behalf of them. They 
are enabling communities to organise in settings where people have been accustomed to demobilisation (and 
demoralisation) for several decades. This mutual aid or ‘mutualism’ creates spaces of encounter over real-
life problems, which are common to the majority and move beyond single-issue activism (Je so’ Pazzo Ex-
OPG 2019). In its praxis, it works a school for learning how to manage the commons. It creates inroads into 
new ways of imagining politics and the state, as emanation of human organisation rather than as exogenous 
impositions. It has the potential for moving ordinary workers from a sceptical or naïve view of political life, 
to a critical one, which is potentially creative (Freire 2018: 9). 
 
4. The Pedagogy of the Virus  
 
Will political life in Iran be changed by covid-19? And if so, how? More than any sanctions regime or 
threat of war from the United States or Israel, the epidemic is reshaping the way people interact with the state 
and its rhizomes of formal and informal power projection, in the field of public institutions of welfare and 
health, in community organisation, ethical legitimacy and care provision, education and economic 
development. It is transforming people’s understanding of the state responsibilities and the public 
authorities ’capabilities, as well as their right to healthcare and social welfare. A pandemic has the potential 
to reshape people’s perspectives on life and death and reconfigure the place of religion, of power and of 
community, and of those performing public duties (see Fedele in this Special Issue). The forces that 
determine the post-epidemic future are made of the encounter between human agency, emotional and 
ideological tensions, scientific and technological politics, all of which is shaped and shapes social 
organisation and solidarity. Once covid-19 is no longer a large-scale threat, whether a vaccine becomes 
widely available or the virus turns into an endemic disease – the question of what constitutes a mutual 
society and a community of support around which life can prosper and state power is regulated may become 
all the more central to political mobilisation and people’s ideas. Here is where the seeds of the emerging 
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political culture will be sowed, forming the struggles that determine the outcomes of state formation in the 
decades to come. 
During epidemics – and crisis in general – fear becomes the sentiment of the present and of the coming 
future. Carlo Levi, an intellectual and physician exiled during Italy’s Fascist government (1922-43), writes 
that ‘fear of freedom is the sentiment that generated fascism’ (Levi 2018). If the fear of losing one’s 
biological life dominates all human relations, there remains no space for community. And it is undeniable 
that the current epidemic has given space and legitimacy to authoritarian propensity, because of the need of 
rapid, drastic, centralised action. But fear and authority are not conducive to the return to the pre-epidemic 
‘freedom’, or to the bourgeois status quo of peaceful cohabitation with dispossession and injustice. Nor they 
can guarantee a life freed from the virus. It is through the concerted and organic mobilisation of people that it 
is possible to create space for social life to prosper beyond the status quo ante, a condition that is neither 
possible nor equitable. It leads, instead, to a generalised lack of morale, to demoralisation towards the 
possibility of change. It is through community organisations and existing solidarity practices, such as the 
ones exemplified above – and the ones extant in conditions of disruption – that the tensions between hope 
and despair are positively resolved. There people realise the vital importance of organisation and of acting 
collectively. This may imply reclaiming the state as an important organizing tool for community building, 
against the grain of decades of the state being perceived as hostile or as an obstacle to the thriving of 
people’s lives. Shifts of this type could lead to a new imagination of the Iranian state, beyond the factional 
politics that it has characterised it since the 1980s. And as the value of life as matter of biology progresses 
over life as a social and political phenomenon, people’s priority becomes to preserve zöe over bios, to keep 
our bare life in place, while abandoning – or better, distancing ourselves – from our civic life, our life as part 
of a human society. This shift in the ethics of life has also profound effects on everyday existence, if not in 
the present, it risks exacerbating inequalities in the near future, especially in the Global South where high-
tech and high-capital solutions will further inequalities between the majority and the elites. The only 
response to this is to organise collectively, through networks of solidarity, which are the workshop of the 
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